Type de document/Document Type	Thèse/Dissertation
Auteur/Author	Goulao, Catarina
URN	BelnUcetd-09252006-143447
Langue/Language	Anglais/English
Titre/Title	Essays on social and private insurance
Intitulé du diplôme/Degree	ECON 3 - Doctorat en sciences économiques
Département/Department	ESPO/ECON - Département des sciences économiques
Jury/Advisors	Nom Titre Cremer, Helmuth Membre du jury/Committee Member d'Aspremont, Claude Membre du jury/Committee Member Maniquet, François Membre du jury/Committee Member Pestieau, Pierre Membre du jury/Committee Member Weiserbs, Daniel Président du jury/Committee Chair Hindriks, Jean Promoteur/Director
Mots-clés/Keywords	Majority voting Asymmetric Information Redistribution
Date de défense/Defense Date	2006-09-18
Résumé/Abstract Social insurance has been increasingly challenged by aging of the population, changes in family structure, increased mobility of workers and firms, and a greater importance of self-employment. These social and economic changes call for a more appropriate design of social insurance both in its financing and its manner of providing. The assessment of the private market alternative is thereby unavoidable. Currently, it is regarded as a better option by societal factions either unhappy with the implicit redistribution of social insurance or with its coverage. Being universal, compulsory, and uniform, social insurance leaves, indeed, individuals little freedom of choice. The first chapter of this thesis calls attention to the eventual loss of welfare induced by the possibility of supplementing social coverage in the market. Since the possibility of topping up changes individuals' preferences for social insurance, it can be elected as a benefit linked to past earnings instead of the minimum uniform one. In such a case, the loss of welfare is not offset by the potential of the market when the poor are considerably more likely to face situations of unemployment, disability or sickness. The compulsoriness of social insurance is addressed in the second chapter where it is shown that a voluntary social insurance always survives because there will always be individuals benefiting from redistribution with respect to risk and income. Additionally, the existence of social insurance per se increases the efficiency of the health insurance market mitigating the effects of adverse selection. Consequently, there is no opposition to social insurance coverage and sometimes there is even unanimity for full social coverage. In the absence of social and private insurance individuals can still insure themselves. This is the topic of the third chapter in which a pool of promises in a moral hazard setup are studied. It turns out to be possible that a pool of promises between rich and poor Pareto dominates the two segregated pools.